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THE COMMON MARKET: A NEW LEGAL ORDER
DENNIS THOMPSON*
The Common Market has in the last nine months had the greatest
shock to its existence, and it appears to have survived. The funda-
mental assumptions on which it is built have been rudely challenged.
It is, therefore, fitting to scrutinize the basis of the European Economic
Community with considerable care.
In Britain we often speak of going into Europe. To this some
reply that Britain is already there. Of course Britain is geographi-
cally in Europe, and she participates in a number of European organi-
zations, as, for example, the Council of Europe, and the (mainly
European) Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), and she is of course the leading member of the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). She is however not in
Europe in the sense that she does not belong to the only body in
Europe that really matters, the European Economic Community.
In their work of drawing up the Treaty of Rome' the architects
of the Treaty set out to do something which was designed to produce
a change in Europe which was to be radical and lasting. There was
a determined effort to put an end to the feuds which had for cen-
turies existed between the nation states of Europe, and to establish
machinery to enable those states to work together for their common
good. It was an attempt to contain the conflicts which had ravaged
Europe in the past and which would undoubtedly continue to chafe
in the future within a peaceful institutional system. The result has
been the establishment of a new legal order in Europe.
This term, the "new legal order," was first used by the Court of
Justice in the First Tariff Commission case; 3 I use the expression
* Inner Temple, London, Barrister-at-Law; Assistant Director of the British
Institute for International and Comparative Law.
'Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed March 25, 1957,
ratified by the Member States of Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and
The Netherlands during that year and effective as of January 1, 1958. (Hereinafter
cited as Treaty).
- For a political background to the Treaty, see CAmPS, BRITAIN AND THE EuROPEAN
COMIMUNITY 1955-1963 (1964); DIEBOLD, THE SCHUmAN PLAN, A STUDY IN
EcoNomic CO-OPE TIoN 1950-1959 (1959).
'N. V. Algemene Transport-en Espeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v.
Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, case 26-62, 9 Recueil 1, 2 Com. Mkt. L. Rep.
105 (1963). Seealso Comment, 1 Co-M. MKT. L. Rxv. 91 (1964).
The court declared, 2 Com. Mkt. L. Rep. at 129:
the Community constitutes a new legal order in international law, for whose benefit
[ 385 ]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
in its widest possible sense. This new legal order which springs from
the Treaty of Rome, and which brings the citizens of the Community
within the protection of the Treaty, also applies to the relations be-
tween the member states. The constitutional position of the member
countries has been radically altered by the terms of the Treaty, and
their relationship is no longer one which exists between fully sovereign
countries. They have all-and equally-subscribed to build the Com-
munity on what has been described as a basis of "supranationality."
The three fundamental ways in which this supranational element
shows itself in the Community are to be seen in the powers of the
institutions. First, the Commission is established as an independent
body with a motive power of its own. Second, the Council of Ministers
is given the right to make certain decisions affecting the member states
by a specially qualified majority vote; and third, the Court of Justice
has compulsory jurisdiction over the member states in respect of the
performance of the Treaty. These three principles are the basis on
which the future of Europe-and all its hopes-are built. It is of
particular significance that it is the first two-the independence of
the Commission, and the principle of majority voting-that have been
specifically challenged recently,4 and therefore are most worthy of
examination. It is therefore my present intention to examine these
principles.
I. THE POWERS OF THE CoMMISSION
The European Commission is one of the novel concepts of the
Treaty. The Commission itself consists of nine individuals who are
responsible for all the decisions of the Commission, and a staff which
is now some two and a half thousand persons in number.' The
President is Walter Hallstein, formerly the distinguished Secretary
of State to Dr. Adenauer. The Vice Presidents are M. Marjolin, a
Frenchman, Dr. Mansholt, formerly Dutch Minister of Agriculture,
and the third Vice President is an Italian. All of them have performed
outstanding services to their own countries, and most of them have
taken part in national administrations; they come from the political
the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the
subjects of which comprise not only the member states but also their nationals.
Community law, therefore, apart from legislation by the member states, not only
imposes obligations on individuals but also confers on them legal rights.
'DeGaulle, Press Conference, Sept. 9, 1965, excerpted in European Community
No. 86, 8 (Oct. 1965).
' In 1964 the establishment numbered 2,555. 8th GENFeAL REPORT OF THE E.E.C.
CommissION, p. 397.
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side of national life rather than from the national ministries. Their
duties are primarily to adopt a European posture. They must be
persons whose "independence can be guaranteed," and they are speci-
fically required to act "completely independently in the performance
of their duties, in the general interest of the Community." They
are required not to seek or accept instructions from any government,
and the governments bind themselves to see that this provision is
observed.6 It may therefore be said that their loyalty is entirely
European, although of course this does not mean that they give up
their own nationalities, or have any less the thoughts and emotions
of nationals of a member state merely because they are members of the
Commission.
Their general powers are contained in article 155 of the Treaty.
Under this article the Commission has to see that the provisions of
the Treaty are observed, and in this respect it has been called the
"watchdog" of the Community. It has the power to bring member
states before the Court if it considers that the terms of the Treaty
are not being complied with. Under article 169 the Commission has
the duty in such a case to give a reasoned opinion to the member state
concerned, and if the latter does not remedy the situation, the Com-
mission has the right, in the exercise of its discretion, to bring the
matter before the Court of Justice.
Its second main function is to exercise the power of decision when
this is expressly conferred upon it, and to participate in the prepara-
tion of acts of the Council together with the European Parliament.
It must then finally implement such matters as are conferred upon it
by the Council. It is this legislative partnership with the Council that
is of supreme importance.
The third task of the Commission is to formulate recommendations
and opinions wherever it is required to do so by the Treaty, but it
also has the power to formulate them whenever the Commission con-
siders them to be necessary, so that even though recommendations
and opinions have no formal legal effect it gives the Commission a
power of comment at will on all matters arising out of the Treaty.
One of the important functions of the Commission is the gathering
of information and the formulation of plans on the European level.
Such matters are necessary for it properly to carry out its functions.




it is not merely the competent body, but also the only body which is
capable of drawing up these plans on a European basis. It thus has
an advantage over the Council, which has only a relatively small
secretariat (some 300 in number), and over the national administra-
tions which do not have access to information beyond their own
country. This places the Commission in a favored position in being
able better than any other body to put forward proposals which are
in the interest of the Community as a whole.
The Commission is essentially a collegiate body, and takes decisions
by majority vote of the Commissioners, provided that a quorum is
present.' When one speaks of decisions, this means legal acts, having
the force of law which are liable to affect the rights of the member
states or the rights of individuals or both. When deciding such an
act there is a limitation imposed by law upon the Commission, for
this must be the decision of the Commission alone. In the case of a
national cabinet, decisions may be taken by individual ministers and
most of those decisions will be taken on the minister's behalf by one
of his officials. Although not a party to it, ministerial responsibility
makes him liable for the consequences, and he must accept it as if it
were his own decision. This never applies in the case of acts of the
European institutions, for such acts cannot be delegated to any other
body or arrived at by any other procedure than that laid down in the
Treaty and the rules made under it.' This ensures that the act in
question is given proper consideration by the Commission and ap-
proved by a number of its members. This is all the more important
as it is the duty of the Commission to arrive at a solution which
disregards narrow national interests and has regard to the interests
of the member countries as a whole.
II. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
The second feature of the Community relates to the taking of
decisions by the Council. The Council of Ministers represents the
member states, and decisions are taken by their representatives on a
much more national basis, for these representatives are the senior
ministers of the governments concerned, and they are answerable to
their own cabinets and to their own parliaments. It is not therefore
"Treaty, art. 162.
'See Soci~t6 nouvelle des usines de Pontlieve-Acieres du Temple (S.N.U.P.A.T.)
v. High Authority, cases 32-58, 33-58, 5 Recueil 275 (1959).
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to be expected that the individual members of the Council would take
the same views as the members of the Commission. As they would
predictably take up positions based on national interest, the procedure
of the Community was evolved so that these national views would not
be a road-block to decision-making. It is the disadvantage of every
diplomatic conference and every inter-governmental organization that
decisions have to be taken unanimously, or at the least by the unani-
mous vote of those whom the measure affects. This right of sovereignty
of states was abrogated by the Treaty of Rome, and the supranational
principle instituted which in certain cases permitted a decision to be
taken by majority vote.
It is important to emphasize that such a means of taking a decision
only applies when it is expressly provided for in the Treaty. Also,
such a decision can generally not be taken without there being first a
proposal of the Commission which is to be approved. If the proposal
of the Commission is amended, then the amendment must be approved
by the Council unanimously. This ensures that the regulation, dir-
ective or decision proposed is broadly one which commends itself to
the interests of Europe as a whole, as it would not otherwise receive
the blessing of the Commission. In addition the system of majority
voting is such"0 that it requires only one major power, France, Ger-
many or Italy, in combination with a smaller power, Belgium or The
Netherlands, to oppose the measure, and the proposal is blocked.
Nor can there be any railroading over the interests of any one country,
because this would not receive the support of the Commission. Nor is
it possible to put any one country into a state of dissatisfaction so
that it votes permanently against the majority, for this would give
every other country a virtual veto. It is the experience of the Council
that the number of occasions when the majority vote is actually exer-
cised is small, and the issues involved are comparatively minor. The
system acts, however, as a goad to induce the member states to agree
unanimously rather than to face the unpleasant prospect of a majority
vote against them. Thus it may be said that the system of majority
voting is not a system designed to enforce the will of the majority over
the minority, but rather it is a means of arriving at a fair decision.
The system of deciding matters by a weighted majority is not new.
It has in fact, been used in some international organizations since
'Treaty, art. 149, unless the amendment is made by the Commission, in which case
it becomes a new proposal.
" The weighted majority is set out in Treaty, art. 148.
19661
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1914. These included the International Institute of Agriculture, the
International Office of Public Health, and the International Hydro-
graphic Bureau. This system of majority voting is used today in three
classes of organizations. The first are those international organizations
of the United Nations connected with finance, the International Mone-
tary Fund, and the World Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
In these, the voting power of each member is determined by the quota
or subscription contributed by it. The second class consists of the
councils of international commodity agreements where the voting
power of each member is determined by the amount of its trade in that
commodity. The third class consists of the European Communities.
Professor Jenks, who has many years of experience of international
organization, has said:
Weighted voting is most readily attainable in an organisation the func-
tions of which are sufficiently circumscribed and well defined to afford
some simple basis for the selection of criteria of relative importance
capable of securing general acceptance. Where an organisation has a
wide range of responsibilities, the factors to be taken into account in
assessing the relative interest of its Members either in its work as a
whole or in particular decisions are likely to be too varied and impon-
derable and the relative weight to be attached to the different factors is
likely to be the subject of acute controversy."
His argument is that weighted voting is not suitable whenever there
is a wide range of different topics to be discussed, and he argued this
in a recent article."2
Professor Jenks claimed that the unanimity principle is outdated,
but that there is no entirely satisfactory method of making decisions
to supersede it. The essence of decision, he argues, is to be found
in a real consensus of opinion, and a decision by majority voting is
no substitute for a negotiated agreement. In every case, it is necessary
that the decision should be negotiated so that a consensus is arrived
at. This applies just as much inside the Community as it does else-
where. On the other hand, it is probably essential to have some
means, if necessary, of arriving at a definite decision and it clearly
would not be effective to supplant the qualified majority by a veto
'Some Constitutional Problems of International Organizations, 22 BRIT. Y3.
INf'L. L. 41, 42 (1945).
'Jenks, Unanimity, The Veto Weighted Voting, Special and Simple Majorities
and Consensus as fodes of Decision in InternatiOnal Organizations, CAMBRIDGE
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LoRD McNAIR (1965).
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system. The system of a qualified majority was included in the
treaties, not because of any kind of federalist dogma or theory, but
because it was recognized as a pragmatic necessity. Those who were
working in the O.E.E.C., as it then was, came to the conclusion that
while the method of unanimity was adequate in the enlargement of
quotas which mainly involved bilateral bargaining, it became wholly
ineffective as a means of reaching decisions affecting all the members,
such as a general reduction of tariffs. The same conclusions are to be
drawn from the work of GATT and the Council of Europe. It was,
therefore, essential to have a method in reserve, even if it was not used
very much, and this was the system of majority voting. This will be
discussed at greater length later in this paper in connection with the
Community crisis with France and the Luxembourg meeting of the
Council of Ministers.
III. THE COURT OF JUSTICE
The third aspect of the supranational character of the Communities,
which I wish to emphasize, is the establishment of the strict rule of
law within the Community, and the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court of Justice over the member states. The significance of this
is sometimes overlooked and it is, I think, instructive to examine those
cases where the member states have been brought before the Court.
There are not many of them. In each case the Commission, which
is charged with the execution of the Treaty, brought proceedings
against the member state under article 169, after the Commission
had presented a reasoned opinion with which the state concerned did
not comply. The first case13 was brought against the Italian Govern-
ment for postponing the import of certain products of pig meat. The
next was also brought against the Italian Government, 4 and concerned
the question of the exact tariff which was to be applied by the Italian
Government on the importation of radio valves from the member
states. A third case,'" against Luxembourg and Belgium, involved the
import duties on gingerbread. The question was whether a special im-
port duty levied on the grant of an import license for gingerbread was
permitted. Italy was involved in a case concerning restrictions on
" Commission of the EEC v. Italian Gov't., case 7-61, 7 Recueil 633, 1 Com. Mkt.
L. Rep. 39 (1962).
" Commission of the EEC v. Italian Gov't., case 10-61, 8 Recueil 1, 1 Com. Mkt.
L. Rep. 187 (1962).
'" Commission of the EEC v. Luxembourg and Belgium Gov'ts, cases 2-62, 3-62,
8 Recueil 813, 2 Com. Mkt. L. Rep. 199 (1963).
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imports, 6 and in another case,17 action was brought again against
Luxembourg and Belgium in respect of the import of milk products,
consisting of milk powder, condensed milk, and certain cheeses coming
from the other member states. A case against Italy on export rebates'
was recently decided and there is presently pending a case against the
French government, 9 in respect of the import of DIOFAN from
Germany into France. Further actions were brought by the German
government against orders of the Commission in respect of the import
duties on sweet oranges" and the tariff quota on wine."' There are
also other cases pending by Germany in respect of the import of
mutton22 and all farm products subject to a special license 3
The significance of these cases is that they are all concerned with
the duties or the right of entry in connection with imports and thus
with the establishment of the customs union. This does not mean,
of course, that there have been no other infringements of the Treaty
by the member states. However, the Commission places most im-
portance on the establishment of the customs union, and has decided
that the terms of the Treaty, in this respect, must be enforced to
the letter. Here, we have a situation which is very different from some
of the other organizations which regulate tariff rates, such as OECD,
GATT, and EFTA. In all these organizations there is no means for
the judicial determination of the infringements of the Treaty, and in
practice, the secretariat does not even know that there has been an
infringement because it has no means of information unless a com-
plaint is made by another member state. This, I think, explains why,
although there is a somewhat complicated machinery in the EFTA
Convention for the diplomatic settlement of disputes,2" this has never
been fully used. It is, however, impossible to believe that these tariff
regulations have been observed implicitly, particularly where there
1 This was a claim by the Italian government that the Commission was not
allowed to grant an authorization to France under art. 226 of the EEC Treaty to
restrict the import of refrigerators from Italy. Italian Gov't v. Commission of the
EEC, case 13-63, 9 Recueil 335, 2 Com. Mkt. L. Rep. 289 (1963).
" Commission of the EEC v. Luxembourg and Belgian Gov'ts, cases 90-63, 91-63,
10 Recueil 1217 (1964).
" Commission of the EEC v. Italian Gov't, case 45-64, 11 Recueil 1057 (1963).
9 Case 38-65.
' German Gov't v. Commission of the EEC, case 34-62, 9 Recueil 269, 2 Com.
Mkt. L. Rep. 369 (1963).
'German Gov't v. Commission of the EEC, case 24-62, 9 Recueil 129, 2 Com.
Mkt. L. Rep. 347 (1963).
- Case 52-65.
',Case 55-65.
24 See LAMBRINIDIS, THE STRUCTURE, FUNCTION, AND LAW OF A FREE TRADE AREA:
THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AssociATIoN 202-38 (1965).
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is no organization to police them. Here is a clear example of the
effectiveness of the Commission, and the need for a court of law, if
the obligations of states are to be properly carried out. One ought to
emphasize that in all these cases, the points of law have not been
of any great importance, and the respective governments have been,
generally, defeated. They have, however, accepted the decisions with
good grace, and have never failed to carry out the orders of the court.
This is certainly one of the most important aspects of the new legal
order that is being created in Europe.
IV. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
The fourth of the major organs of the Community is the European
Parliament. One of the most perplexing problems in the Community
is the relationship between the Commission, the Council, and the
European Parliament. It would be difficult to apply the doctrine of
separation of powers, particularly as this doctrine, however much it
has been preached in Europe, is rarely practised there. Every Euro-
pean government, including the British, is in full control of its parlia-
ment, and can determine the progress of legislation. We do not expect,
therefore, to find in Europe any separation between the executive and
the legislative power. Although the national parliaments control legis-
lation in the member states, the European Parliament has no legis-
lative function at all. It is purely consultative with the single excep-
tion of the rather curious power to dismiss the Commission as a body,
by a vote of censure carried by a two-thirds majority.25 This provision
must, however, be regarded as ineffective, because the Commission
is no longer the stumbling block in the progress of the Community.
This provision was originally designed for the Coal and Steel Com-
munity -' where the High Authority had, in theory, considerably
greater powers of initiative than the Commission under the Rome
Treaty. The second difficulty is that even if a vote of censure was
carried, the members of the Commission would continue in office until
they were replaced.27 This replacement must be by the unanimous
agreement of the governments of the member states, and, therefore,
unless there was unanimity-which would be very remarkable if any
serious crisis arose in the Community--the Commission would con-
tinue in office.28 As things have turned out, relations between the
Treaty, art. 144.





Commission and the Parliament have been very good. There has
been a continuous dialogue and the various committees of the Parlia-
ment meet, usually in Brussels, in order that they may discuss their
business with the Commission officials. There is, therefore, very close
co-operation between the two. It does not necessarily follow, however,
that in the cases where it is required under the Treaty, or even when
not obligatory, that when the Commission has invited the opinion of
the Parliament, this opinion has always been followed. On many oc-
casions it has, but on others the Commission has chosen to ignore the
opinion of Parliament, and has done so with impunity. Nor has the
Commission always been anxious to have discussions in the Parliament.
An example of this arose over the Greece negotiations when the
Parliament was only consulted after the Treaty had been drawn up and
was ready for signature. Nevertheless, it must, I think, be said that
on the whole, the Commission has taken the European Parliament
into its confidence, and that it has been considerably assisted by the
views which Parliament has put forward, particularly in relation to
the political developments of the Community.
The real difficulty lies in the powers of the Council. Although
the Commission has certain executive powers conferred upon it, which
it can exercise independently, either by terms of the Treaty, or by
subsequent regulations, the general policy is firmly in the hands of the
Council. Although the Council cannot always decide independently of
the Commission, it is undoubtedly a fact that the temper of the
Council determines the policy of the Community, both in the executive
and the legislative field. One might be tempted to describe the Com-
mission as an executive without a cabinet, the cabinet powers being
exercised by the Council, yet neither body being capable of acting
alone. In this connection, it is, I think, unfortunate that the meetings
of the Council are secret, and there is no publication of the views
expressed, or the way in which the members of the Council vote.
This means that the participants at the Council meetings, who are
national ministers of cabinet rank, are somewhat embarrassed when
they return to their own parliaments to give an account of their
activities in Brussels. While they may say how they voted on partic-
ular Council decisions, they may not say how others voted. The
national parliaments to whom these ministers are ultimately respon-
sible, have, of course, their own representatives in the European Parlia-
ment, and it is perhaps between the Council and the European Parlia-
[VOL. 41 : 383
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ment that the greatest conflict within the Community has arisen. Both
the parliamentarians and the Council are concerned with political
decisions, and it is here that what is described as "la relation malade"
has arisen. Between the Council and the Parliament there has been
a lack of co-operation and consultation, which has put these bodies
on bad terms with each other. It is, therefore, difficult to see, at any
time in the future, how the powers of the Parliament will be extended,
unless the Council has greater confidence in it. There are provisions
in the Treaty which contemplate elections for the European Parliament
by direct universal sufferage,29 and there is every reason why direct
elections should take place. If the Community is to dispose of the
large sums accruing to it, out of its own resources in the agricultural
fund, a principle to which most would subscribe is that there should
be "no taxation without representation." This is a principle which
most parliaments in Europe are now prepared to accept, and this
means that there is a need for parliamentary control of the Com-
munity budget. When, however, the votes in the Parliament have to
be counted, the question of how these representatives are appointed
becomes important. It will no longer be sufficient, as is now the
case where only the general consensus of opinion is required, for these
representatives to be nominated by their own parliaments or govern-
ments. There will have to be some more precise method of appoint-
ment, to which the only democratic solution would be a form of
election, either from their own parliaments, or directly by the citizens
of the Community, and it is the last alternative which is generally
preferred. It is, therefore, clear that there is a serious political crisis
in the Community, and although it cannot be expected that direct
elections take place in the immediate future, nevertheless, it is reason-
able to assume that this is a requirement which cannot be completely
dismissed. This was the reason why the Commission included plans
for the future of the European Parliament in its ill-fated proposals
of June last year.
V. THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE TREATY
Having described the essential elements which are responsible for
the effectiveness of the Community structure, one must then examine
what means the Community has for adapting itself to the conditions




rules which cannot be altered except in the most exceptional circum-
stances, and the success or failure of an institution very often depends
on the flexibility of its structure. It is, I think, particularly relevant
to refer to the United Nations, where the two most striking develop-
ments are to my mind the increase in the role of the United Nations
Secretariat, and the competence of the General Assembly under the
"Uniting for Peace" resolution.3" In this way the United Nations was
able to progress rapidly in circumstances which had never been con-
templated by the contracting parties when the Charter was enacted.
It is, therefore, desirable to see what features of the Community
are responsible for providing it with a remarkable dynamism, in spite
of the very considerable elements of dissent which it has so far been
able to contain. The first point to emphasize is that the Treaty pro-
vides not only a constitution, but also machinery for legislation-a
basic framework called a loi-cadre under which legislation can be
adapted or repealed as necessary.
The Treaty, itself, says very little about agriculture except to lay
down the general principles that there should be a fair standard of
living for the agricultural community, markets should be stabilized,
delivery of supplies should be guaranteed at reasonable prices. 1 This
will be, of course, a paradise for all, not only for the farmers, but also
for the consumer. What the Treaty omits to say is precisely how this
is to be achieved. It says only that the organization should consist
either of (a) common rules as regards competition, (b) compulsory
co-ordination of the national marketing organizations, or (c) European
marketing organizations.32
The whole policy for agriculture when the Treaty was signed had
still to be worked out, and indeed it has been worked out under the
very able direction of Sicco Mansholt, the member of the Commission
responsible for agriculture. The policy for agriculture, adopting a
system of levies between the member states until the end of the
transitional period of the agricultural policy, with permanent levies
against third countries in respect of imports to the Community, is
entirely a post-treaty development. So too, are the co-ordination com-
mittees which are responsible for the management of each product,
and although the question of the agricultural orientation and guarantee
'See Uniting for Peace Resolution of Nov. 2, 1950, reported at 9 U. N. BULL.
498 (1950).




funds was mentioned in the Treaty, 3 few further provisions were laid
down. The result is that by using the Community machinery, the
whole of the agricultural policy has been developed and established.
It may be amended or repealed in the same way and, therefore, the
Community will be free to make such alterations in its agricultural
policy, as may be advisable if other European countries enter the
Community.
There are two other broad policies which are to be determined in
this way under the Treaty, namely the Common Transport Policy
and the Common Commercial Policy. These policies are both to be
agreed upon by qualified majority vote after the end of the second
stage."4 The main concepts of the Common Transport Policy, namely
the system of the equalization of infrastructure costs, the licensing of
undertakings and the system of bracket or forked rates for tariffs are
all developments since the Treaty was signed. These ideas are em-
bodied in proposals of the Commission and have only now received the
sanction of the Council." Commercial Policy is proving the most
intractable problem of all. This is perhaps not surprising as a Com-
munity foreign trade policy is pregnant with political differences which
cannot at present be resolved. This is also true of the whole system of
the notification of agreements under the anti-trust provision of article
85 of the Treaty which was entirely developed by the Community
method, after the Treaty had come into force.
VI. REGULATIONS AND DnRECTIVEs
The way in which "European legislation," if that is the right name
for it, can be enacted, is provided for by article 189. The most effec-
tive method of legislation is by regulations which have general appli-
cation among the member states and individuals, as if they were
European statutes.
There are great advantages in a regulation, for a regulation is part
of Community law, and will be enforced by the Community. This
can be done through the operation of article 169 against the member
state where the breaches are taking place. Furthermore, it is also
subject to the system of interpretation of Community law by the
Court of Justice under article 177, which gives power to the Court,
not only to interpret the Treaty, but also to interpret the acts of the
' Treaty, art. 40(4).
"' Treaty, arts. 75, 111, 113.
Agreed by the Council on June 22, 1965.
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institutions. This enables the regulation to have a uniform application
over the whole of the Community. The main difficulty is that where
there are already laws in existence, the enactment of a Community
regulation may produce a conflict between the Community rule and
the national rule. This conflict is undesirable, and it may involve the
susceptibilities of the member governments. Thus it is accordingly
provided in article 189 that the Community may enact directives which
are binding "in respect of the result to be achieved upon every mem-
ber State but the form and manner of enforcing them shall be a matter
for the national authorities." This means that wherever the directive
is used or has to be used, the member states have the task of complying
with the directive, and putting it into the form of a national law
which will be binding upon the citizens of that state. The reason
for this directive approach is quite obvious. It is because national
legislation may take a number of different forms, and if one takes,
for example, company law, the whole theory and structure of company
legislation may be completely different in different countries, as it is
for example in France and Germany, and it would be impossible to
enact a regulation relating to company law which simply overrode
national legislation. Any legislation would have to be suitably adapted
by the member state concerned to its own particular style of legislation.
The principle of the directive exists to protect the national laws already
in force in the member states, and it is to be noticed that in the very
important provisions in the Treaty for the approximation of laws the
Council's actions must be unanimous." Thus, the ever widening field
of harmonization of laws-a process which is as indispensable for
the growth of a real Common Market as is the dismantling of the
internal tariff barriers themselves-may only be carried out through
the medium of the directive.
In the case of directives, however, not only will the form of the
legislation be different in each member state, but the national legisla-
tion will be separately and independently interpreted and applied by
the national courts with the result there may be substantial divergences
in the operation of a directive in the different member states. This
could lead to a very unfortunate result, for it is precisely in the
establishment of those laws which refer to standards, such as those
which affect the quality of imported goods with respect to the safety
or health or general convenience of the public that uniformity is most
"'Treaty, arts. 100-102.
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critically needed. If there are to be provisions relating to the coloring
matter for foodstuffs 37 or the preservatives in foodstuffs,3" these pro-
visions are valueless unless they are identical in all the member states,
yet under the Community system such provisions may be introduced
only by directives, as in fact, they have been. It is interesting to
note that one of the complaints the French government levelled against
the Commission, (under head four of the "decalogue") was that the
Commission has been proposing directives which contain so much
detail that the only liberty left to member states is to choose the form
of the legislation in which they are to be embodied. The French
Government regarded this as a usurpation of the national jurisdiction,
which ought to be abandoned. It seems to me, however, that the fault
lies not so much in the Commission, but in the rigidity of the Treaty
provision, that harmonization of laws may only be carried out by
means of directives, for it is precisely in this area that the detail must
be identical. It would, therefore, seem that it would be much more
appropriate, when the Community is dealing with such matters as
standards relating to goods, that there should be power in the Com-
munity to legislate by means of regulation.
A further objection to the directive is that the national parliaments
are being called upon to pass legislation without, in effect, having any
discretion, or irrespective of whether or not they agree with it. If a
parliament were to refuse to implement a directive of the Community,
the government concerned would be responsible for an infringement
of the Treaty, and should be proceeded against, under article 169,
although how a government can control its members of parliament
is something that many governments would be only too pleased to
discover. It would be more logical simply to take power away from
the parliaments altogether, by allowing the Community to preempt
their competence by passing Community regulations which would not
require the consent of the national parliaments.
VII. THE CRISIS OF JUNE 30, 1965
Agricultural policy has always been of extreme interest to the
French, and for this reason the Community has made a great effort
to comply with French desires by pushing forward the agricultural
policy as fast as possible. In this it has encountered the obstruction
of Germany. In Germany, prices are high, and in France compara-
tively low, so that any integration of Community agriculture will
1Oct. 10, 1962, Official Gazette, 2645/62. " Nbv. 5, 1963, Official Gazette.
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give France a large market in Germany, and if she exports outside
the Community, France will be entitled to heavy deficiency payments
from the other countries. It could be said indeed that part of the
price that the other five had to pay for the continuing support of
France was the promotion of a satisfactory agricultural policy.
The agricultural policy began in January 1962, when the first regu-
lations on the subject were made. 9 At this time the Financial Regu-
lation" on the subject of agriculture, which came into force on July 1,
1962, was laid down to extend for only three years and would then
have to be replaced by a new one. The Regulation therefore was due
to expire on June 30, 1965, and this was the deadline for the renewal.
The Council meeting of December 15, 1964, was an extremely im-
portant one, for it resolved the problem of the wheat price for the
Community, against which there had been considerable opposition
from Germany. The Council agreed that the common price would
come into effect on July 1, 1967, and would be fixed in units of account.
This meant that there would, thereafter, be no further need for the
system of levies presently applied in intra-Community trade, and of
course it would enable negotiations on the Kennedy Round to proceed
on a realistic basis. This agreement of the Council was essentially a
compromise, but it was regarded as a decisive step in the establish-
ment of the common agricultural policy. The Council invited the
Commission to submit, before April 1, 1965, proposals for financing
the common agricultural policy for the period 1965-1970, and for
implementing article 2 of Regulation No. 25, which is already part
of Community law.4 Article 2 reads as follows:
Revenue from levies charged on imports from third countries shall be
the property of the Community and shall be appropriated to Community
expenditure; the budget resources of the Community shall comprise such
revenue together with all other revenues decided in accordance with the
rules of the Treaty as well as contributions of member States in accord-
ance with Article 20042 of the Treaty. The Council shall in due course
initiate the procedure laid down in Article 201 of the Treaty so as to
implement the above provisions.
Article 2 provides that the revenue from levies charged on imports
from third countries shall be appropriated to Community expendi-
tures. This, having regard to the relatively high wheat price that was
' Reg. Nos. 19-25.
' Reg. No. 25.
" Council Minutes, EEC Bulletin, Feb. 1965, pp. 11-19.
' This article sets out the scale of contributions of each member state to the
Community budget.
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fixed, is reckoned to give the Community an enormous income of the
order of four thousand million dollars, which would have to be dis-
tributed by the Community institutions. Article 2 also refers to article
201 of the Treaty which contemplates the replacement of the financial
contributions to the Community from member states by revenue ac-
cruing from the common tariff or other resources available to the
Community. The article provides that the Commission shall submit
proposals to this end to the Council. At the same time there was
pressure coming from the European Parliament, as well as from some
of the parliaments of the member states, who thought the control
of expenditure in accordance with general parliamentary practice
should be under the control of the European Parliament to some
extent. This, of course, also raised the question eventually of direct
elections to that Parliament.
The Commission, having received the mandate from the Council to
prepare proposals, prepared proposals for financing the common agri-
cultural policy for 1965-1970. At the same time it tied on two further
proposals, the first relating to the financing of the common agricultural
policy after the single market stage had been reached, i.e., in 1967,
and secondly, for the arrangements for the distribution of the joint
revenues of the Community which involved strengthening the role
of the European Parliament.43 The Commission thus produced a
package proposal which undoubtedly had a high political content and,
of course, the Commission must have been aware that the French
government was completely opposed to the strengthening of the Euro-
pean Parliament, where, in fact, the Gaullists were present, but were
either actively hostile or abstaining in respect of most of the work.
It was also generally believed that on this occasion, at any rate,
the Commission was not unanimous. A further point is that these
proposals were not communicated privately to the Council members
as is the usual custom, but they were discussed by President Hallstein
at the session of the European Parliament.44 The European Parlia-
ment then debated the Commission's proposals which were generally
approved," although it is to be noted that during the debate the pro-
' The Commission's proposals, submitted to the Council on March 31, 1965, are
published in the supplement to EEC Bulletin, May, 1965.
"Held in Strasbourg, March 22-26, 1965. For the proceedings during this
period, see European Parliament, MONTHLY BULLETIN OF EUROPEAN DOCUMENTA-
TION, April, 1965.
'" Held May 11, 1965. For the proceedings, see European Parliament, MONTLY
BULLETIN OF EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION, June, 1965.
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posals were opposed by the Gaullist faction, on the grounds that the
Commission was not entitled to include the amendments to the powers
of the European Parliament in proposals for the financing of the
common agricultural policy, and the Gaullists abstained when the vote
on the resolution was taken.46 It was clear that conflict was in the air.
Nevertheless, when the Council of Ministers met on June 28, there was
no suggestion that it would be impossible for some compromise to be
arrived at. The discussions continued for three days, and it is to be
noted that on June 30 the French parliamentary assembly approved47
the ratification of the Treaty on the merger of the executives of the
Community, and indeed there is no indication that M. Couve de
Murville did not intend to reach a compromise. By the evening of
June 30, the French foreign minister had already achieved his major
object, namely to separate the proposals of the Commission, and thus
divorce the question of financing the immediate agricultural program
(only necessary for the next twelve months) from the question of
increased parliamentary powers. There was, therefore, no reason why
the regulations for the immediate agricultural year, which started the
next day, should not have been agreed upon, except that the German
and Dutch parliaments had insisted upon the extension of the powers
of the European Parliament, and these ministers in the Council were
unable to act without the specific approval of their cabinets.
The normal way out of this dilemma would have been to "stop the
clock," as was done on December 31, 1961, at the suggestion of the
French government, when the clock was stopped for fourteen days.
The present session, however, broke off at about 10:30 p.m., after
which M. Couve de Murville was on the telephone to Paris. The
result of that telephone call, when the session resumed, was that M.
Couve de Murville indicated that unless agreement was reached by
midnight, he would adjourn the session, which he did. The French
thereupon complained that the other members of the Council had
been in breach of their agreement to agree upon new financial regula-
tions by June 30, and this failure was in no way the fault of the
French government. The French, thereafter, abstained from attending
Council meetings, although they accepted a form of written procedure,
which had been devised for emergencies. The French did, however,
attend other committees, but a sharp line was drawn between the
" See EEC Bulletin, May 1965, p. 49.
" The act of ratification has not yet been delivered by the French government.
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administration of continuing matters already agreed upon (gestion)
and any new policies (novation). The French did not participate in
the latter discussions. The Commission immediately sought to justify
itself in a memorandum in which it suggested a formula which might
be agreed upon. The French, however, were in no mood for compro-
mise, and everyone awaited the famous press conference of General
de Gaulle on September 9. When his words were examined, it is clear
that in many respects the General appreciated what the Community has
achieved, for he said:
As far as the economy is concerned, we believe it is true that the syste-
matic organization of the respective activities of the countries lying round
the Rhine and the Alps corresponds to the facts that they are close
neighbors, that their production is at the same time analogous and com-
plementary, and that it is in keeping with the needs of our times to form
units on a broader basis than that of the individual European states .... 48
He also said that the Commission refrained from excessive en-
croachments upon the only valid powers which are the individual
states. He also maintained that France had consistently proposed
plans for political progress which he described as organized co-
operation between the states, evolving no doubt towards a confed-
eration which would permit other countries such as England and
Spain to join in. However, the Commission "suddenly abandoned its
political discretion" and formulated plans for handling an enormous
budget of its own, which would not be supervised by the member
states, who represent the taxpayers. He also complained that by
the majority voting system, slated to come into force in the Council
on January 1, 1966, France would be exposed to the possibility of
being overruled in any vital economic matter.
The situation was aggravated by a speech made by M. Couve de
Murville to the French National Assembly on October 20, when he
spoke of "general revision" of the Treaty. But a reunion of the Five
was firm and unanimous in a statement made after a Council meeting
on October 26, held without French participation. The Five solemnly
affirmed the necessity of continuing to implement the treaties of Paris
and Rome in accordance with the principles contained therein. In
order to achieve the progressive merger of their national economies
in both the industrial and agricultural sectors, they called upon the
French to resume negotiations, and invited them to a special meeting
,' DeGaulle, Press Conference, Sept. 9, 1965, excerpted in European Community
No. 86, 8 (Oct. 1965).
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of the Council of Ministers, at which the Commission would not be
present. 9 The day to day work of the Community continued, but it
was impossible to make any progress with new proposals, and the
Community was seen to be grinding slowly to a halt.
The next event of consequence was the French presidential election
which was held in December. During a short but feverish campaign,
five candidates opposed General de Gaulle and succeeded in reducing
de Gaulle's share of the poll to forty-four per cent of the total vote.
A significant element of the campaign was that all five opponents,
from left to the extreme right, were putting forward positive European
policies for France. This was particularly true of M. Lecanuet. He
was President of the M.R.P.; he had the blessing of M. Jean Monnet;
and he succeeded in stealing three million votes which would probably
have gone to General de Gaulle. This result forced General de Gaulle
into an official ballot with M. Mitterand at which de Gaulle polled
fifty-five per cent of the total. This result was a strong demonstration
by the French that they continued to support European policies, and
an assurance that after the departure of de Gaulle, which was the
only thing to be reckoned with in the future, there might be reason
to suppose that the French would support a full European policy
and operate the European treaties in a true and loyal spirit.
After his election, General de Gaulle accepted the invitation of
the Five to meet in Luxembourg without the Commission on January
17, 1966. Before this meeting, the French put up a series of stiff de-
mands. First, they proposed an elimination of the system of majority
voting in the Council whenever the vital interests of any particular
country were affected, and, of course, each country would have to be
the sole judge as to when its vital interests were involved. Secondly,
the "style" of the Commission would have to be modified. The French
also put forward a tight program for the adoption of the budget of the
Community, the fusion of the three Commissions, the financial regula-
tion of agriculture, and an agreement by April 1966, on the second
move of national tariffs towards the common customs tariff. When
the fusion treaty was ratified, there would be a new Commission,
consisting of, at first, fourteen members, and it was quite clear that
President Hallstein and one or two other members of the Commission,
who were persona non grata to the French, would not be re-elected.
At the first meeting on January 17 and 18, the ministers reached a
'" The declaration is set out in EEC Bulletin, Dec. 1965, p. 14.
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deadlock. They were unwilling to consider the question of majority
voting, which was the principal subject discussed, and the meeting
adjourned with the intention of resuming at the end of the month.
Discussions were resumed on January 29 and 30, and a formula was
found for dealing with decisions where the Treaty provided that they
should be taken by majority vote. Where very important interests of
one or more of the member states are involved, the Council will en-
deavour to reach unanimous agreement within a reasonable time.
The French considered that the discussion in such a case must always
go on until unanimous agreement was reached. The Six noted that
there was a divergence of views, but they all, nevertheless, considered
that this divergence did not prevent the Community's work being
resumed in accordance with the normal procedure. The position,
therefore, is that there may be trouble in the future, but on the
whole it is not very likely. The Six agreed with some of the points
presented by the French with regard to the style of the Commission
and particularly that it should co-operate more closely with the gov-
ernments of the member states, and that it should make its proposals
known to the Council before announcing them elsewhere. It was also
provided that the Commission should not be entitled to receive, on
its own, the credentials of heads of missions accredited to the Com-
munity, but that they should be received jointly by the President
of the Council, as well as the President of the Commission.5°
The question of majority voting is undoubtedly one of the most
important elements of the Treaty of Rome, and as noted previously,
one of the three supranational features that is essential if the Treaty
is to remain effective. It is impossible for the Treaty to survive
unless the Community is able to command the continuing consent
of the member states. Once any member state feels that its vital
interests are being overridden, then it will be impossible, as the ex-
perience with France has shown, for the Community to continue,
let alone make any progress. It is, therefore, not a practical proposi-
tion to take any decisions which affect these vital interests against
the wishes of the state concerned, and in fact, this has never been
done. Out of about twelve cases where a decision was taken by the
Council by qualified majority, it is possible to give details of seven.
Three of these involved decisions on tariff quotas under article 25.
Another case was the decision taken under article 38 to expand Annex
' For details, see European Community, Feb. 1966.
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II which contains the list of agricultural products." Then there was
the decision laying down general principles for a common policy of
vocational training. There was the amendment to the statute of ser-
vice for officials of the Community of November 10, 1964.02 The last
case was more important and it concerned the regulation on group
exemptions by the Commission from article 85(1) .1 It was opposed
by Italy, which has since lodged an appeal against the validity of
this regulation to the Court of Justice. Looking at these examples,
it would not seem that there is anything very serious in any of them.
The point about majority voting is that it provides machinery for
use in the last resort as a means of coming to a decision and it is
doubtful if it will be necessary to seek to apply it any more in the
future than has been done in the past.
VIII. THE FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITIES
In assessing the effect of the French move against the Community,
the first result is that the legal terms of the treaties still stand, which
represents success by the Five. On the other hand there are still
many things which will have to be decided by common agreement in
the future, and France will have opportunities for further obstruction
if she wishes to use them. The present situation appears to be that
France is happily back to work in Brussels and that business with
the Commission and the Council is normal again. It would, however,
be premature to speak of any renewal of the Community spirit, and
one of the results which was always to be feared was the raising
of terms by the other countries. If the French could play at national-
ism, so could the others, and there is some concern that this will
happen in the future, particularly in regard to agricultural policy.
Meanwhile there is a tendency to move forward only from one pack-
age deal to another. Thus there may be a general ratification of the
Treaty for the merger of the European Executives by the national
parliaments, but these ratifications are expected to be held up by the
national governments until the composition of the new Commission
is agreed upon. This may provide a basis for the continuation of
President Hallstein, even if only for a limited period.
It is difficult to say whether the independence of the Commission
"'Regulation No. 7, adopted Dec. 18, 1959. Compare 1 CCH COmMON MxT.
REP. 995 (unofficial translation).
Reg. No. 182/64.
'Reg. No. 19/65, adopted March, 1965. Compare 1 CCH CommoN MKT. REP. 1
2718 (unofficial translation).
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or the principle of majority Council voting is the more important.
The experts seem agreed that the powers of the Commission are the
more important. In the result both have happily survived. The real
loser has been the European Parliament. Although the Commission
proposed that there should be a small increase in its powers, the
Parliament finds no place in the final Luxembourg communiqu6.
The struggle for some democracy within the Community will go on, but
it is no nearer a solution.
As long as there is so much political dissension as to the future
role of the Community, it will be impossible for any great progress
to be made. The Community may perhaps be able to continue the
work of consolidation of the results already achieved. There is much
to do in the field of harmonization of laws, and the new policy of
the Commission to encourage the growth of firms and mergers" may
be an added stimulus to an early decision on a Community turnover
tax and perhaps some integrated company laws.
The next main objective in internal policy is the fusion of the
three Communities themselves, and not only may this permit a common
energy policy to be developed, but it may also remove from the
Treaty some of its rigidity. The Rome Treaty is an imperfect docu-
ment, even treated from the economic standpoint alone.
An example of this rigidity is to be found in the decisions of the
Commission. Commission decisions which may have legal conse-
quences must be decided by a quorum of the nine man Commission.
Not only does the Commission have to make decisions on all regula-
tions and directives, but even such matters as decisions that call for
information from individual firms and which may lead to fines if the
requests of the Commission are not complied with, must be taken
by the Commission. This principle, referred to earlier, was estab-
lished in the S.N.U.P.A.T. case," where in connection with the pere-
quation fund for steel scrap in the Coal and Steel Community, it
was determined that the Commission was not entitled to delegate its
powers to any other body. This has caused difficulty in the case
of the agricultural policy, where even the C.I.F. prices for wheat and
other agricultural products have to be decided almost daily by the
Commission, while, in fact, the agricultural policy is in the hands
of a number of management committees. The machinery adopted is
" EEC Commission doc. SEC (65) 3500, Dec. 1, 1965.
' Soci6t6 nouvelle des usines de Pontlieve-Acieres du Temple (S.N.U.P.A.T.) v.
High Authority, cases 32-58, 33-58, 5 Recueil 275 (1959).
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that the management committee makes a recommendation which if
not adopted within one month by the Commission is automatically
referred by decision to the Council. The proposal is put forward
by the management committee, subject to agreement by the Com-
mission, enabling the formal decision to be made by the Commission.
Another respect in which the Treaty is defective concerns mone-
tary policy which has been described as the "missing chapter" of the
Treaty. Under the terms of the Treaty, the member states are called
upon to co-operate in working out their monetary and financial policies,
but there is no machinery provided for the development of a Com-
munity policy that will be established by majority voting in the
Council. At the time the Treaty was entered into, the attitudes of
the member states were such that it was not possible to agree upon
the establishment of a common monetary policy, and there is, there-
fore, no means under the present Treaty by which such a policy
can be adopted, for there is no provision for the taking of decisions
by majority voting, unless it is expressly provided for in the Treaty.
Another difficulty relates to an energy policy. As matters stand,
all three Communities are concerned with some aspect of energy.
Coal is under the E.C.S.C., atomic power under EURATOM, natural
gas and oil under the EEC. Furthermore, there are considerable
divergences between the rules relating to coal and steel, and the rules
applicable under the other treaties. There has been an ad hoc com-
mittee from all three Communities to consider an energy policy. It
will not, however, be easy to introduce a Community policy for energy,
as this will involve major changes in the economic structure of the
member states. If, as is recommended, energy costs are to be kept
low, then a number of coal mines in the Ruhr will have to be closed
down, and this is already producing resistance from the Germans.
However, one of the objectives of the merger of the Communities
will be to establish a common energy policy, and it may be that
in the future Treaty, which combines the three Communities, there
will be powers to develop Community policy in any field within the
competence of the Community. I think, here, one may notice a very
great convenience in the United States' practice of having all matters
which relate to interstate commerce dealt with by the federal govern-
ment.
Having discussed the new legal order in Europe, it would not be
right to leave the subject without some reference to the rest of Europe
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and, indeed, the rest of the world. Many will agree that Europe with-
out France or the Community without France is unthinkable; so too,
is Europe without Britain, and no organization will be entitled to call
itself European unless it gives Britain the opportunity to participate.
During the course of the negotiations in 1961 and 1962, it was made
clear that the British were anxious to subscribe to the terms of the
Treaty of Rome, provided that there were certain safeguards in respect
of: (a) the Commonwealth countries, (b) her EFTA partners, and
(c) her own domestic policies. 6 These conditions would probably have
been satisfied in 1963, had there been a political will on the part of
France and the other member countries that Britain should join. In
the intervening years, however, some of the difficulties have eased. The
Commonwealth link has distinctly loosened, and the fact that among
the African Commonwealth countries, Nigeria has entered into nego-
tiations, separately, with the EEC indicates that many no longer
rely on British support in respect of their trade. The trade pattern
in both Canada and Australia is also changing and the problems
that remain are relatively small. As far as EFTA is concerned, it is
now clear that if Britain were to join the Community, she would not
join alone. Norway, Denmark and Ireland would negotiate to enter,
at the same time, and there is no doubt that the three neutral countries,
Austria (which has already begun), Sweden and Switzerland would
negotiate their own terms of association. Portugal would no doubt
come within the same category as Turkey and Greece, provided that
it was politically acceptable to the Community. England's policies
have also undergone a change, and even agriculture is no longer the
great obstacle that it was; government subsidies are declining and the
Conservative party at any rate, is ready to accept a form of agricul-
tural levies, which would bring British agricultural policy much more
into line with that of the Community. There is also reason to believe
that the days of a cheap world market in food are numbered.
On the other hand, there are very pressing reasons in the industrial
and monetary field which make it much more necessary for Britain
to join the Community if she is to survive as an effective influence in
the world. A home market which is limited to the population of the
EFTA countries is not large enough to provide for the research and
development necessary in the modern technological age, and it is
essential that she should have access to a wider market. In mone-
Resolution of House of Commons, Aug. 2, 1961.
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tary matters, it is essential that the European countries should under-
pin the sterling balance of payments. The recent crisis has shown-and
one can say that this crisis has been a continuing one for a decade or so
-that it is almost impossible for Britain to survive in the modern world
as long as she has to maintain a favorable trade balance, and at the
same time support a world currency. In fact, Britain's balance of
payments policy is not her own. She is entirely dependent on the
assistance of the Group of Ten, and the International Monetary Fund,
and it is in her own interest that there should be a thorough-going
monetary policy in an enlarged Community which would put an end
to the chronic British crisis. On the other hand, the balance of pay-
ments may become important in relations with the rest of the sterling
area.
With regard to the industry generally, the experience of France
may perhaps be an example to Britain. When France was considering
joining the Community, M. Mend~s France said France could not
enter a common market because she was not competitive enough.
First she must become competitive and then she could go in. 7 In
fact, the opposite was the case. A highly protected industry was
forced into a Common Market, and very rapidly this industry became
competitive as a result. It is very likely that the effect of joining
the Common Market would be to make Britain considerably more
competitive than she is today, and thus she might achieve the rate of
economic growth enjoyed by the Community countries. In this way
the dissentions and weaknesses of Europe would be eliminated and she
would be enabled to play her rightful part as one of the forces of the
free world.
See CAMPS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 77.
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